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COMBATING URBAN SPRAWL IN 
MASSACHUSETTS: REFORMING THE 
ZONING ACT THROUGH LEGAL 
CHALLENGES 
BENJAMIN KRASS* 
Abstract: Urban sprawl is one of today's most pressing environmental 
challenges, especially in Massachusetts. The desire to live in rural areas, 
while demanding urban sen'ices, threatens to make Massachusetts a 
checkerboard of development, with long-lasting ecological, aesthetic, 
and social effects. Ironically, although Massachusetts is seen as a 
national leader in various environmental policy areas, the Common-
wealth lags far behind other states in progressive land use planning. 
This anomaly is perpetuated by the Zoning Act, which gives broad 
zoning-freeze protection to vacant land, thereby unduly constraining a 
locality's ability to plan for growth. Without comprehen-sive reform of 
the Zoning Act, localities cannot adequately manage growth and will 
continue to be overburdened in providing the level of basic services 
necessitated by unplanned growth. With no legislative solution ahead, 
those portions of the Zoning Act that severely restrict a locality's ability 
to plan for growth should be challenged in the courts. 
Land use is the forgotten agenda of the environmental movemenf.I 
INTRODUCTION 
The resonating environmental events of the late 1960s and 1970s 
include the burning of the Cuyahoga River in Cleveland, Ohio,2 Love 
Canal in western New York,3 and the Allied Chemical Kepone disaster 
* Managing Editor. BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW, 2002-03. 
I would like to thank Jonathan Witten and Jo Lown for their help in producing this Com-
ment. 
1 John Turner & Jason Rylander. Land Usc: Thc Forgottcn Agcnda, i1l THINKING ECOL-
OGICALLY: THE NEXT GENERATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 61 (Marian R. Chertow & 
Daniel C. Est)' eds., 1997). 
2 Sec, c.g., Roger Meiners & Bruce Yandle. Commo1/ Law and thc Conceit oj J\Jodcrn Envi-
ml/1ncllfal Policy. 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 923,924 (1999). 
3 Id. at 924, 951-52. 
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in Hopewell, Virginia.4 In response, Congress passed statutes such as 
the Clean Water Act,5 the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act,6 
and the Comprehensive Environmental Responsibility, Compensa-
tion, and Liability Act,7 to restore environmental integrity.s The pas-
sage of time brings new environmental challenges, even as society 
continues to work toward achievement of the goals set out in response 
to environmental problems of years past. Urban sprawl is foremost 
among these new environmental challenges.9 While urban sprawl has 
been on the radar screen since at least the early 1990s, it has not gen-
erated the same response as the environmental catastrophes of the 
late 1960s and 1970s.10 In this regard, John Turner and Jason Ry-
lander describe current land use patterns, and the consequential ur-
ban sprawl, as the "forgotten agenda."l1 In order to illustrate the 
magnitude of the problem, Turner and Rylander invite people to 
journey across America without ever leaving their hometown: 
Take a look across America. From Boston to Baton Rouge, 
massive changes have taken place on the landscape and in 
our society. A seasoned traveler, dropped onto a commercial 
street anywhere in America, could scarcely tell the location 
from the immediate vista. A jungle of "big box" retailers, dis-
count stores, fast-food joints, and gaudy signs separated by 
congested roadways offers no clues to location. Every place 
seems like no place in particular. 
Hop in an airplane and look at the land use patterns be-
low. Cul-de-sac subdivisions accessible only by car-separated 
from schools, churches, and shopping-spread out from de-
caying cities like strands of a giant spider web. Office parks 
and factories isolated by tremendous parking lots dot the 
countryside. Giant malls and business centers straddle the 
exit ramps of wide interstates where cars are lined up 
bumper to bumper. The line between city and country is 
4 See, e.g., William Goldfarb, Changes in the Clea1l Water Act Since Kepone: Would They Have 
Made a Difference 1, 29 U. RICH. L. REV. 603, 605-12 (1995). 
5 Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2000). 
6 Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6922k (2000). 
7 Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 
U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (2000). 
8 Meiners & Yandle, supra note 2, at 924-25. 
9 Turner & Rylander, supra note I, at 60-61. 
10 See id. 
II Id. at 61. 
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Llurred. Green spaces are fragmented. Only a remnant of 
natural spaces remains in tact. 12 
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As this Comment will detail, current Massachusetts law acts as a bar-
rier to local communities that desire a future different from that de-
scribed by Turner and Rylander. 
Although urban sprawl is widely recognized as a problem in Mas-
sachusetts, the legislature has not yet amended the statutes that in-
hibit the ability of localities to plan comprehensively in order to ac-
commodate growth. 13 Briefly stated, urban sprawl is the demand of an 
increasingly affluent population to live in the spacious countryside, 
and yet enjoy the same level of services as would be available in a 
city.14 It is the result of a faulty balancing of the "public's competing 
demands for open space, wildlife, recreation, environmental quality, 
economic development, jobs, transportation, and housing."15 Massa-
chusetts has focused on economic development at the expense of 
these other demands by refusing to amend archaic zoning and subdi-
vision-control statutes, and, as a result, has hampered the efforts of 
localities to control sprawl,l6 In fact, the American Planning Associa-
tion, in Planning for Smart Growth: 2002 State of the States, reported that 
new legislative policies in Massachusetts encouraging smart growth 
would be ineffective without significant changes to the already-
existing zoning statutes,l7 
The Commonwealth's apparent failure to confront this prob-
lem18 is particularly striking because Massachusetts has historically 
12 [d. at 60. 
13 Joel S. Russell. Massachusetts Land-Use Laws-Time for a Change, LAND USE LAW & 
ZONING DIG., Jan. 2002, at 7, 12, available at http://www.planning.org/LULZD/mass-
laws.htm (last visited May 12, 2003). The two exceptions are the Cape Cod Commission 
and the Martha's Vineyard Commission. each of which has been given regional power over 
its land use planning. Jon Witten, Affol'dable Housing-At What Plice?, LAND USE LAW & 
ZONING DIG., Jan. 2002, at 6 n.1, available at http://www.planning.org/LULZD/mass-
laws.htm (last visited May 12, 2003). 
14 See ROBERT H. FREILICH, FROM SPRAWL TO SMART GROWTH: SUCCESSFUL LEGAL, 
PLANNING, AND ENVIRONMENTAL SYSTEMS 2 (1999). For a more in-depth discussion of the 
definition of sprawl, see infra Part I. 
15 Tur;ler & Rylander, supra note I, at 61. 
16 See AM. PLANNING AsS'N, PLANNING FOR SMART GROWTH: 2002 STATE OF THE STATES 
22 (2002), at http://www.planning.org/ growingsmart/pdf! states2002.pdf (last visited May 
12,2003). 
Ii !d. 
18 JENNIfER STEEL, MASS. AUDUBON SOc'Y, LOSING GROUND: AN ANALYSIS OF RECENT 
RATES AND PATTERNS OF DEVELOPMENT AND THEIR EFFECTS ON OPEN SPACE IN MASSACHU-
SETTS 1 (2d ed. 1999). 
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been considered one of the most environmentally progressive states,19 
It is not surprising that the Commonwealth has progressive environ-
mental policies, given its demographic characteristics.20 Massachusetts 
is a wealthy state with a well-educated citizenry.21 It has the "third 
highest per capita income" and the largest proportion of people in 
the United States with at least a college degree.22 In addition, eco-
nomic sectors that are important to Massachusetts, such as recreation 
and tourism, are based on a well-protected environment.23 Signifi-
cantly, Massachusetts has actually translated its progressive policies24 
into truly progressive substantive environmental statutes.25 
Urban sprawl remains a largely unsolved problem in Massachu-
setts26 despite the State's success in these other environmental 
realms.27 The preference for living in the suburbs and the increase in 
the number of second homes have caused the amount of land used 
for housing to increase over ten times as fast as the rate of population 
growth.28 Under this measurement, Massachusetts is one of the fastest-
sprawling areas in the United States.29 Among the data indicating that 
sprawl is an increasing problem in the Commonwealth,30 one fact 
stands out-between 1972 and 1996, the amount of developed land 
increased approximately fIfty-nine percent, while the Common-
wealth's population only increased roughly six percent.31 According to 
Robert Durand, former Secretary of Environmental Mfairs,32 the last 
twenty years have produced a thirty-eight percent increase in the 
19 See infra Part II. This is notwithstanding recent reports indicating that its oversight of 
industry compliance may be comparably lax. See David Arnold, Pollution Checking Said to 
Lag in Mass., BOSTON GLOBE,Jan. 21, 2003, at B1. 
20 See Cymie Payne, Local Regulation of Natuml &sources: Efficiency, Effectiveness, and Fail~ 
lIess of Wetlands Permitting ill Massachusetts, 28 ENVTL. L. 519, 528-29 (1998). 
21Id. 
22Id. 
23 Id. at 529. 
24 See id. at 528-29. 
25 See discussion infra Part II. 
26 See Chris Frates, Nature LovCTS Flock to Census: Thousands ID Bay State's Wildlife, BOSTON 
GLOBE,June II, 2001, at B1. 
27 See discussion infm Part II. 
28 Payne, supra note 20, at 528. 
29 Anthony Flint, "First-Ring" Suburbs Hurting, Study Finds, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 21, 
2001, at B1. 
30 See generally STEEL, supm note 18 (reporting and analyzing relevant statistics). 
31 Id. at 1. 
32 The Secretary of Environmental Affairs heads the Execlltive Office of Environ-
mental Affairs in Massachusetts. See Frates, supm note 26, at Bl. 
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amount of developed land in Massachusetts; every day, the State loses 
forty-four acres to development.33 
This Comment will focus on the Zoning Act34 and the lack of 
growth management legislation in Massachusetts.35 Part I provides a 
working definition of urban sprawl. and Part II documents the largely 
progressive environmental agenda of Massachusetts. Part III examines 
section 6 of the Zoning Act, one of the statutory provisions impacting 
the ability to manage growth, and its effect on pre-existing noncon-
forming structures, vacant land, and "approval not required" (ANR) 
plans. Part III reviews approaches taken by localities within the exist-
ing statutory scheme. In Part IV, Massachusetts's statutory scheme is 
compared with that of Oregon, a state that is generally recognized for 
its progressive land use planning statutes. Part V explores whether 
urban sprawl can be managed using existing regulatory tools under 
the Zoning Act, concludes that it cannot, and suggests legal chal-
lenges to the Zoning Act. 
I. URBAN SPRAWL: DEFINITIONS AND EFFECTS 
Because "urban sprawl" is a term with varied connotations, the 
three following definitions describe the term as used in this Com-
ment. Urban sprawl can be considered "the desire for a rural life-
style-more spacious housing, lavish kitchens, master baths, and 
'great rooms'-coupled with large lot 'ranchettes,' but ironically with 
a demand for urban services, and access to urban income .... "36 This 
definition focuses on the demands of an increasingly affluent popula-
tion that desires space in the countryside along with a level of services 
commensurate with that found in a city.37 
A slightly more refined definition describes sprawl as "low-density 
development on the edges of cities and towns that is poorly planned, 
land-consumptive, automobile-dependent [and] designed without re-
gard to its surroundings."38 Finally, in a recent report on patterns of 
33 [d. 
34 The Zoning Act, MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 40A. §§ 1-17 (2000). 
35 See AM. PLANNING AsS'N, supra note 16, at 71. At the same time, effectively control-
ling sprawl in Massachusetts will not be possible ",ithout reforming the Massachusetts Low 
and Middle Income HOllsing Act, 1969 Mass. Acts 712 (codified as amended at MASS. GEN. 
LAWS ch. 40B, §§ 20-23 (2000)). Witten, supra note 13, at 8. 
36 FREILICH, supra note 14, at 2. 
37 See id. 
38 [d. at 16 (providing the definition of sprawl given by Richard Moe, President of the 
National Trust for Historic Preservation). 
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development and open space, the Massachusetts Audubon Society 
defined sprawl as "[d]evelopment that is relatively low density; has 
separate residential and commercial components, and is, therefore, 
largely automobile-dependent; and is poorly integrated with existing 
infrastructure and the environment."39 These definitions link sprawl 
to planning and put the burden on government to figure out how to 
accommodate the desires for a rural lifestyle and urban services while 
protecting health and safety in general, and the environment in par-
ticular.40 
While still governor of New Jersey in 1998, current Environ-
mental Protection Agency Administrator Christine Todd Whitman 
noted, "Sprawl eats up our open space. It creates traffic jams that 
boggle the mind and pollute the air. Sprawl can make one feel down-
right claustrophobic about our future. "41 It is not just an abstract 
planning concern, but a problem that has direct impacts on daily 
life.42 At its core, "[c]ontaining sprawl is creating a sustainable envi-
ronment."43 Although this Comment avoids a protracted policy dis-
cussion about sprawl, understanding its effects on communities and 
the environment provides context for the legal issnes.44 
One expert, Robert Freilich, identified six adverse effects of 
sprawl: (l) "deterioration of existing built-up areas (cities and first-
and second-ring suburbs);"45 (2) "environmental degradation-loss of 
wetlands and sensitive lands, poor air and water quality;" (3) "over-
consumption of gasoline energy;" (4) "fiscal insolvency, transportation 
congestion, infrastructure deficiencies, and taxpayer revolts;" (5) "ag-
39 STEEL, supra note 18, at 2. 
40 See FREILICH, supmnote 14, at 16-17. 
41 [d. at 29. 
42 See id. 
43 !d. at 30. 
H Many book~ and articles have dealt with the question of why society should enact 
policies that control sprawl, and recent reports illustrate both successes and failures in 
dealing with the issue. See generally, e.g., ANN BROWN ET AL., SIERRA CLUB, SPRAWL: THE 
DARK SIDE OF TIlE AMERICAN DREAM (1998) (analyzing sprawl nationally by focusing on 
the twenty population centers most characterized by unplanned development), at 
http://www.sierraclub.org/sprawl/report98/report.asp (last visited May 12, 2003); SIERRA 
CLUB, SMART CHOICES OR SPRAWLING GROWTH: A 50-STATE SURVEY OF DEVELOPMENT 
(2000) (reporting development patterns in all frfty states and highlighting positive and 
negative trends), at http://www.sierraclub.org/ sprawl/50statesurvey /SmartChoices.pdf 
(last visited May 12, 2003); STEEl., supm note 18 (analyzing patterns of development in 
Massachusetts and its effects on biodiversity). This Comment concentrates on the legal 
effect of current Massachusetts statutes on efforts to control sprawl. 
45 First- and second-ring suburbs refer to the first two layers of growth that build up 
around a city core. See FREILICH, Sltpra note 14, at 7-8. 
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ricultural land conversion; and" (6) "un affordable housing."46 Al-
though its effects are both economic and environmental,47 sprawl's 
detrimental impacts on the environment, in particular, have received 
a lot of attention.48 Sprawl creates additional environmental problems 
when large tracts of land are cleared for homes because both the in-
dividual large-lot homes and their supportive public services, such as 
sewers and septic systems and roads, can severely alter existing ecosys-
tems.!9 
The damaging aesthetic effects of urban sprawl should not be 
discounted either.50 For example, in rapidly expanding areas, poorly 
planned strip commercial development is often glaringly located im-
mediately along the roadside, rather than in enclaves, partially 
shielded from view of passing motorists.51 By magnifYing the visibility 
of this type of development, such poor planning exacerbates the aes-
thetic unpleasantness of sprawI.52 
Massachusetts cannot afford to ignore the problem of sprawl be-
cause the consequences of doing so are potentially severe. Nonethe-
less, whereas Massachusetts can be criticized for moving slowly to con-
fron t sprawl, it is largely immune from such criticism with regards to 
its other environmental policies. 
II. MASSACHUSETTS ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 
A. Wetlands 
Massachusetts is one of the most forward-thinking states on envi-
ronmental policy in general.53 In the area of wetlands protection, for 
example, Massachusetts has been historically progressive and contin-
ues to be so today. 54 In 1963, Massachusetts enacted the first statute in 
46Id. at 16. 
4i See id. 
48 See, e.g., James H. Wickersham, Note, The Quiet Revolution Continues: The Emerging 
New Modelfor State G1Vwth Management Statutffl, 18 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 489, 495 (1994) 
("Low-density suburban developmen t patterns can radically affect the environment."). 
49Id. 
50 See id. 
51 See id. 
52 See id. 
53 See James P. Lester, A NCl/J Federalism 7 Environmental Policy in the States, in ENVIRON-
MENTAL POLICY IN THE 19905, at 63 (NormanJ. Vig & Michael E. Kraft eds., 2d ed. 1994) 
(labeling Massachusetts environmental programs "progressive" due to the Common-
wealth's high commitment to environmental protection and strong institutional capabili-
ties for implementation). 
54 See Payne, supra note 20, at 520, 534. 
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the United States to control draining and development in coastal wet-
lands,55 followed two years later by the first freshwater wetlands law.56 
Remarkably, in the midst of the movement to federalize environ-
mental laws in the early 1970s, in response to lax state regulation, 
Massachusetts affirmed its commitment to environmental regula-
tion.57 The Massachusetts legislature combined its two existing wet-
land laws, expanded their jurisdiction, and installed municipal con-
servation commissions as the primary permitting authorities.58 
In addition to historically protecting wetlands to a greater extent 
than other states,59 Massachusetts arguably has enjoyed quantitative 
success as well.60 The Massachusetts Wetlands Protection Act (VVPA)61 
appears to have been quite successful in significantly slowing the rate 
of wetlands loss since its passage.62 Although it is difficult to measure 
rates of wetlands loss with absolute accuracy, one study indicates that 
the reduction was dramatic, with a net loss of wetlands in Massachu-
setts of 163,700 acres in 1979 alone, compared with only 9275 acres 
lost over the entire period from 1986 to 1991.63 
It should also be noted that the \VPA was passed at a time of in-
creasing real estate development, when wetlands loss would otherwise 
be expected to increase.64 That the wetlands-loss rate remained steady, 
and might even have decreased, attests to the VVPA's success.65 Cymie 
Payne, an attorney with the United States Department of the Interior, 
analyzed the VVPA and concluded that it "has successfully reduced the 
wetlands loss rate ... despite the dense and growing population of the 
Commonwealth and the intense development pressure of the last 
twenty years."66 The Commonwealth's wetlands program success has 
been mirrored in other fields as well. 
55 Id. at 534. 
56Id. 
57Id. 
58Id. 
59Id. 
60 Payne, supra note 20, at 524. 
61 Massachusetts Wetlands Protection Act, MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 131, § 40 (2000). 
62 Payne, supra note 20, at 524. 
63 Id. at 527 (citing MASS. DEP'T OF ENVTL. PROT., AN AsSESSMENT OF NON-
COMPLIANCE WITH TIlE \VETLANIlS PROTEc'nON PROGRAM: A FINAL REPORT f"OR THE 
104(b) (3) EPA STATE WETLANDS PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT GRANT CDOOI633-01, at fig.3 
(1994)). 
64 Id. 
65 Id. 
66 !d. at 567-68. 
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B. Hazardolls Waste 
Massachusetts has also been a leading innovator in the field of 
hazardous waste clean-up.67 Massachusetts's version of the federal 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liabil-
ity Act68 is the Massachusetts Oil and Hazardous Material Release Pre-
vention Act (Act).69 The Massachusetts Contingency Plan (MCP),70 
similar to the federal National Contingency Plan (NCP),71 has been 
considered a national model for its privatization of hazardous waste 
site clean-ups.72 The Council of State Governments awarded the MCP 
an Innovations Award in 1995.73 The authors of a guide on brown-
fields redevelopment noted that due to the state programs under the 
MCP, and "the increased level of experience of the players involved, 
the tools available for the redevelopment of brown fields properties in 
Massachusetts are increasing in number and effectiveness."74 
Unlike some states, Massachusetts has a provision for the assess-
ment and recovery of natural resources damages under the Act. 75 The 
natural resources damage program began in 1983 and had recovered 
a total of $23.6 million through 1998.76 A report by the Environ-
mental Law Institute puts this success into perspective. As of 1998, 
thirty-two states claimed to have independent state authority to re-
cover for natural resources damages, but only ten states had actually 
done so, and eleven more states had claims pending.77 
67 Ned Abelson et a\., Alassachllsctts, ill BROWNFIELDS: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO 
REDEVELOPING CONTAMINATED PROPERTY 456 (Todd S. Davis & Kevin D. Margolis eds., 
1997). 
68 Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 
U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (2000). 
69 Massachusetts Oil and Hazardous Material Release Prevention Act, MASS. GEN. 
LAWS ch. 21E, §§ 1-19 (2000). 
70 Id. § 3. 
71 42 U.S.C. § 9605. 
72 Abelson, supra note 67, at 456. 
73/d. 
74/d. 
75 ENVTL. LAW INST., RESEARCH PROJECT No. 941724, AN ANALYSIS OF STATE SUPER-
FUND PROGRAMS: 50 STATE STUDY, 1998 UPDATE l47-48 (1998), available at http://www.eli. 
org/pdf/50state98.pdf (last visited May 12, 2003). 
76 /d. at 148. 
77 /d. at 4. 
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C. Biodiversity 
A third environmental policy area in which Massachusetts is pro-
gressive is in its efforts to map statewide biodiversity.78 Massachusetts 
officials claim that, so far, no other state has created such a checklist 
of all visible organisms.79 The effort to create a statewide map of exist-
ing species appears to be the nation's most ambitious.80 In addition, 
Massachusetts seems to be the first state to set state conservation goals 
based on such a list.81 Jessica Wilkinson, director of the state biodiver-
sity program for the Environmental Law Institute, called the State's 
approach to biodiversity: "visionary in land use. "82 
The 2001 Biodiversity Days, a three-day effort to assemble data on 
biodiversity, involved almost 35,000 people in approximately 270 of 
the State's 351 towns and cities.83 The participants gathered informa-
tion on plant and animal species. The baseline information was fed 
into a state master list and will be used to determine the continuing 
viability of these species in the future. 84 Robert Durand, then-State 
Secretary of Environmental Mfairs, indicated that the information 
would be used in making environmental policy decisions and as an 
educational too1.85 According to Bill McComb, head of the Depart-
ment of Natural Resource Conservation at the University of Massa-
chusetts at Amherst, this statewide mapping effort is vital because the 
State's biodiversity has increased as meadows have evolved into forests 
and water quality has improved.86 The project will also help to map 
invasive species, which the State seeks to contro1.87 
Against this backdrop of environmen tal policy successes, this 
Comment contrasts a principal Massachusetts land use statute, the 
Zoning Act, and its relationship to sprawl. 
78 EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF ENVTL. AFFAIRS WEB SITE. IN1:RODUCTION TO THE EOEA 
VISIBLE SPECIES OF MASSACHUSETTS DATABASE, at http://data.massgis.state.ma.us/Biodi-
yersity (lastyisited May 12, 2003). 
79 Beth Daley, State Plans a CenSlts with Nature ill Mind, BOSTON GLOBE, May 18. 2001, at 
A12. 
00 !d. 
81 Beth Daley, Science to Dlive Conservation of Mass. Land, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 10, 2001, 
at B1. 
82Id. 
83 Frates, supra note 26, at Bl. 
84 Daley, supra note 79, at A12. 
85 Frates, supra note 26, at Bl. 
86 Daley, supra note 79, at A12. 
87Id. 
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III. THE CURRENT MASSACHUSETTS ZONING ACT 
ENCOURAGES SPRAWL 
615 
Although several Massachusetts land use statutes encourage 
sprawl,88 this Comment will only focus on the principal land use stat-
ute, the Zoning Act, the present day version of which was first passed 
in 1975.89 Section 6 of the Zoning Act is particularly relevant because 
of its impact on local efforts to manage growth. Its provisions unnec-
essarily restrict local authorities' ability to combat sprawl by granting 
broad vested-rights protections.9o Section 6 addresses pre-existing 
nonconforming uses, structures and lots, as well as the impacts of zon-
ing changes on vacant land.91 The legislature has yet to enact substan-
tive changes to section 6 to deal with its impediments to managing 
sprawl; the section largely exists as it was first enacted in 1975.92 
Such constraints on the power of local bodies to regulate land 
use are especially puzzling given how political power is apportioned 
by the Massachusetts Constitution.93 Land use decisions are generally 
made by relying on the police power, which inheren tly resides in state 
governments.94 Thus. a town or municipality derives its power to make 
land use decisions from the state.95 There must be a specific grant of 
legislative authority from the state to towns and municipalities to ex-
ercise this police power.96 
88 See Russell, supra note 13, at 12. For example, any comprehensive reform must in-
clude revisions to the Massachusetts Low and Middle Income Housing Act, Mass. Gen. 
Laws ch. 40B, §§ 20-23 (2000). 
89 The Zoning Act, 1975 Mass. Acts 808 (codified as amended at MASS. GEN. LAWS 
ch. 40A, §§ 1-17 (2000». 
90 See id. § 6. 
91 [d. 
92 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 40A, § 1 (West 1994). It is unclear why the Massachu-
setts legislature has refused to amend the Zoning Act. The American Planning Association 
reported that efforts to reform the State's comprehensive planning laws have been unsuc-
cessful despite an attempt by planning advocates to pass laws requiring communities to 
dewlop comprehensive plans and then link those plans to local zoning ordinances. AM. 
PLANNING AsS'N, supra note 16, at 7l. 
93 See MASS. CONST. amend. art. II, § 89; Home Rule Procedures Act, 1966 Mass. Acts 
734 (codified as amended at MASS. GEN. LAWS eh. 43B, §§ 1-20 (2000». 
94 See ViiI. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926); FREILICH, supra 
note 14, at 58. 
95 Sec FREILICH, supra note 14, at 58. 
96 [d. 
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In 1966, Massachusetts voters adopted the so-called "Home Rule 
Amendment. ''97 As a result, Massachusetts became a state in which 
power is decentralized and granted to local communities according to 
the Massachusetts Constitution and subsequent legislation.98 Before 
1966, municipalities could not impose zoning controls without an ex-
press delegation from the state.99 Now, municipalities may pass zoning 
ordinances or bylaws without express state authorization.100 Local 
authority is still limited, of course, where its laws would conflict with 
or are preempted by, state or federal law.101 Therefore, although 
towns and municipalities can pass ordinances and zoning bylaws 
through their police powers under the Home Rule Amendment, 
these regulations cannot frustrate the "purpose or implementation of 
a general or special law enacted by the Legislature in accordance with 
[the Home Rule Amendment's] provisions."102 Thus, the current state 
zoning act is entitled the "Zoning Act" and not the "Zoning Enabling 
Act. "103 
A. Section 6 of the Zoning Act and Its Impact on SmaTt Growth Policies 
Within the Zoning Act, section 6 in particular has direct ramifica-
tions for attempts to control urban sprawl because it governs the pro-
tections given to both pre-existing nonconforming uses and struc-
tures, and to vacant land.104 Although the vacant land protections of 
section 6 are the most detrimental to local growth management ef-
forts, it is helpful to use the protections given to pre-existing noncon-
forming uses and structures as a baseline for comparison. 
Pre-existing nonconforming structures are created by almost any 
change in zoning laws.105 These zoning changes diminish the useful-
ness of the resulting pre-existing nonconforming structures.106 This is 
because additions or alterations to such structures are governed by a 
97 Teresa Rohwedder, Note, Regulation of Zoning NOllconfor11lities in Massachusetts: The 
"Difficult and Infelicitous' Language of Section 6, Chapter 40A, Massachusetts Zoning Act, 28 NEW 
ENG. L. REV. 1123, 1128 (1994). 
98 See MASS. CONST. amend. art. II, § 89; ch. 43B, §§ 1-20 (2000). 
99 Rohwedder, supra note 97, at 1128. 
100 [d. 
101 [d. 
102 Bd. of Appeals v. HollS. Appeals Comm., 294 N .E.2d 393, 409 (1973). 
103 Rohwedder, supra note 97, at 1128-29. 
104 SeeThe Zoning Act, MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 40A, § 6 (2000). 
105 See id. 
106 Richard A. Forsten, Land Use "Reform' and the Law of Unintended Consequences: Are We 
Headed Where We Want To Gor, 18 DEL. LAW. 5, 7, 25-26 (2000). 
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standard different from those governing structures meeting current 
zoning laws.107 
The Zoning Act generally makes it more difficult to build an ad-
dition onto a pre-existing nonconforming structure than to modify a 
structure that meets current zoning law requirements. lOB As a result, 
pre-existing nonconforming structures are often sold or left underu-
tilized while new structures are built, encouraging new development 
instead of encouraging the reuse of existing buildings. l09 At the same 
time, zoning-freeze protections provided to vacant land handicap the 
ability oflocalities to plan for this new development. 110 
An analogy might be made to the concept of brownfields and 
green fields. Brownfields are sites that are either lightly contaminated 
or perceived to be contaminated. ll1 Numerous regulations governing 
the clean up of brownfield sites might provide an economic disincen-
tive for a developer to redevelop a brownfield site. l12 In that situation, 
a developer might pick a greenfield instead-an undeveloped site, 
usually in the suburbs or rural areas-which is presumed to be uncon-
taminated.1l3 In much the same way that stigmatization of brownfield 
sites has encouraged sprawl,114 the scarce zoning-freeze protection 
given to pre-existing nonconforming structures and uses also encour-
ages new development and sprawl. 115 
Nonetheless, there are legitimate reasons to limit modifications 
to pre-existing nonconforming structures.116 Indeed, a locality pre-
sumably passes new zoning laws to protect the health, safety, or wel-
fare of the community, and thus the newly regulated "harms" should 
not be easily allowed to expand. ll7 However, comparing this lack of 
\07 MASS. GEN. LAWS eh. 40A, § 6. 
108 Forsten, supra note 106, at 7 (noting the paradox that older properties often need 
to be modified to conform with modern business practices, and retain their utility, yet it is 
nearly impossible to modify an older property and meet current zoning requirements). 
\09 [d. at 7, 25-26 (noting that existing, nonconforming properties are not recycled 
because it is far easier, and encouraged under the law, for newer businesses to improve 
undeveloped land rather than improve a pre-existing nonconforming property). 
110 Russell, slIpra note 13, at 3. 
III Todd S. Davis & Kevin D. Margolis, Defining the Broumjiclds PmblclII, in BROWNFIELDS: 
A COMPREHENSIVE (;UIDE Tn REDEVELOPING CONTAMINATED PROPERTY 5 (Todd S. Davis & 
KeYi.n D. Margolis eds., 1997). 
112 !d. at 8. 
113 !d. at 5. 
114 [d. at 12. 
115 Forsten, supra note 106, at 26. 
116 !d. 
117 See ViII. of Euclid y. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926) (upholding zoning 
as a legitimate exercise of the police power); Forsten, supra note 106, at 7. 
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zoning-freeze protection for non-conformities to the zoning-freeze 
protections given to vacant land, it becomes clear that the Zoning Act 
strongly contributes to sprawl.1l8 
B. Zoning Changes and Pre-existing Nonconforming Strltctures 
The paragraph of section 6 dealing with zoning changes and pre-
existing nonconforming structures provides: 
Except as hereinafter provided, a zoning ordinance or by-law 
shall not apply to structures or uses lawfully in existence or 
lawfully begun, or to a building or special permit issued be-
fore the first publication of notice of the public hearing on 
such ordinance or by-law required by section five, but shall 
apply to any change or substantial extension of such use, to a 
building or special permit issued after the first notice of said 
public hearing, to any reconstruction, extension or struc-
tural change of such structure and to any alteration of a 
structure begun after the first notice of said public hearing 
to provide for its use for a substantially different purpose or 
for the same purpose in a substantially different manner or 
to a substantially greater extent except where alteration, re-
construction, extension or structural change to a single or 
two-family residential structure does not increase the non-
conforming nature of said structure.1l9 
Given its complexity and incoherence, It IS not surpnsmg that 
volumes of litigation have arisen from this "sentence," although it is 
unclear whether a direct facial challenge has ever been brought. 120 As 
the Massachusetts Appeals Court discerned, the first "except" clause 
("[e]xcept as hereinafter provided") applies to zoning changes and 
the alteration of a pre-existing nonconforming structure. l21 The sec-
ond "except" clause ("except where alteration") deals with zoning 
118 SeeThe Zoning Act, MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 40A, § 6 (2000). 
119 [d. 
120 See Powers v. Bldg. Inspector, 296 N.E.2d 491, 494 (Mass. 1973); Willard v. Bd. of 
Appeals, 514 N.E.2d 369, 372 (Mass. App. Ct. 1987) ("The first paragraph of [chapter 40A, 
section] 6 ... contains an obscurity of the type which has come to be recognized as one of 
the hallmarks of the chapter."); Fitzsimonds v. Bd. of Appeals, 484 N.E.2d 113, 115 (Mass. 
App. Ct. 1985) (noting that the provisions of section 6 of the Zoning Act "are as difficult 
and infelicitous as other language of the act recently reviewed"). Clearly, this sentence 
needs to be rewritten merely to make grammatical sense. 
121 Willard, 514 N.E.2d at 372. 
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changes and certain modifications to a single- or two-family residen-
tial structure when the modification does not increase the noncon-
forming nature of the structure.122 
Without distinguishing between residential or non-residential 
structures, it appears that three situations are governed by section 6: 
(l) extension or structural change of a nonconforming structure; (2) 
reconstruction of a nonconforming structure; and (3) alteration of a 
nonconforming structure, to provide for its use for a substantially dif-
ferent purpose, manner, or extent. 123 Comparing a property owner's 
protection from zoning changes in these three circumstances to the 
protection of vacant land, it is clear that vacant land protections are 
considerably more generous. This is because Massachusetts General 
Laws chapter 40A, section 6 gives a municipality much less control 
over the development of vacant land than it does over pre-existing 
nonconforming structures.124 Although there are valid reasons to re-
strict modifications to pre-existing nonconforming structures, it is un-
reasonable to provide such broad protection to vacant land.125 
C. Zoning Changes and Vacant Land 
The fifth paragraph of section 6 addresses the application of zon-
ing changes to definitive plans for currently vacant land.126 The perti-
nent text provides: 
If a definitive plan, or a preliminary plan followed within 
seven months by a definitive plan, is submitted to a planning 
board for approval under the subdivision control law, and 
written notice of sHch submission has been given to the city 
or town clerk before the effective date of ordinance or by-
law, the land shown on such plan shall be governed by the 
applicable provisions of the zoning ordinance or by-law, if 
any, in effect at the time of the first such submission while 
such plan or plans are being processed under the subdivi-
sion control law, and, if such definitive plan or an amend-
ment thereof is finally approved, for eight years from the 
date of the endorsement of such approval .... 127 
122Id. 
123 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 40A, § 6; Rohwedder, supra note 97, at 1150-51. 
124 See discllssion infra Part III.e. 
125Id. 
126 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 40A, § 6. 
127/d. 
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This zoning-freeze protection applies to the land and not to the pre-
liminary or definitive subdivision plan.128 Therefore, a town or mu-
nicipality cannot apply new zoning controls to vacant land protected 
by an approved definitive plan until eight years after the endorsement 
of the definitive plan's approval.l 29 
It is difficult for a locality to manage growth and con trol sprawl 
when vacant land is exempt from changes in zoning law for eight 
years. 130 This is because growth patterns often change rapidly and 
cannot be accurately predicted. l3l A locality will have a hard time re-
acting to growth in a comprehensive manner because different par-
cels of vacant land may be governed by different laws enacted during 
any given eight-year period. 132 A locality is forced to plan for growth 
eight years from the time it passes a law, with no recourse if conditions 
rapidly change during that eight-year period.133 
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has recognized that 
section 6 affords "broad protection to developers. "134 According to the 
court, the section's purpose is to protect landowners from "'the prac-
tice in some communities of adopting onerous amendments to the 
zoning by-law after submission of a preliminary plan which is opposed 
by segments within the community."·135 The statute provides land-
owners with protection from zoning law amendments that would "un-
predictably and unfairly burden the development of their land."136 
While recognizing the hardships that this might work on a progressive 
town planning board, the court was clear that a board could not inter-
fere with a vested property right created by the legislature.137 It also 
noted that the zoning-freeze period has been an overriding concern 
of the legislature.138 The zoning-freeze period was initially three years, 
128 Mass. Broken Stone Co. v. Town of Weston, 723 N.E.2d 7,9 (Mass. 2000). 
129Id. 
130 Russell, supra note 13, at 3. 
131 See, e.g., id. at 3-4 (noting that once word of proposed zoning change leaks out, 
landowners hurry to file development applications; the development resulting from this 
knee-jerk filing is difficult for a locality to predict). 
132 Id. at 6. 
133 See Mass. Broken Stone, 723 N.E.2d at 9 (recognizing the absolute protection of the 
zoning freeze on the land covered by a subdivision plan). 
134 See Heritage Park Dev. Corp. v. Town of Southbridge, 674 N.E.2d 233, 236 (Mass. 
1997). 
135Id. (quoting MASS. DEP'T OF CMTY. AFFAIRS, REPORT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COM-
MUNITY AFFAIRS RELATIVE TO PROPOSED CHANGES AND ADDITIONS TO THE ZONING ENA-
BLING ACT, H.R. Doc. No. 5009, at 38 (1972». 
136Id. 
137Id. 
138Id. 
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but has subsequently been extended to five, seven, and then to eight 
years.139 In another indication of the broadness of this protection, 
lower Massachusetts courts have held that developers are entitled to a 
zoning freeze with inconsistent subdivision fIlings or by fIling plans 
with the sole intent of invoking the freeze. 140 
A more in-depth review of a classic Massachusetts case noting this 
broadness is helpful. In Heritage Park Development C01P. v. Town of South-
bridge, the Heritage Park Development Corp. (Heritage) had a condi-
tionally approved definitive subdivision plan from the planning board 
of Southbridge.141 Heritage and the planning board entered into a 
covenant that provided that the board's approval of the plan would be 
automatically rescinded if Heritage did not complete certain ground-
work required to service each subdivision lot on or before a set 
date. 142 Heritage did not complete the work on time and the plan's 
approval was automatically rescinded. 143 Twenty-two months after the 
date of the automatic rescission, Heritage asked the board to extend 
the covenant's construction deadline, but this request was denied.144 
The plaintiff then asked to re-fIle a subdivision plan that would only 
need to comply with the zoning bylaws in effect when the board con-
ditionally approved the definitive plan.145 The board required any re-
submitted plan to comply with the current zoning bylaws.146 Heritage 
then fIled a complaint requesting a declaratory judgment stating that 
that the property was subject to the zoning laws in effect when the 
subdivision plan had first been submitted.147 
The board argued that the eight-year zoning freeze had termi-
nated when the approval of the subdivision plan was automatically 
rescinded.148 The court disagreed, holding that Heritage was entitled 
to an eight-year statutory zoning freeze, and that the automatic rescis-
sion had not deprived the plaintiff of that "vested zoning protec-
139 [d. The zoning-freeze period was extended to eight years in 1982. Act of June 28, 
1982, ch. 185, 1982 Mass. Acts (codified at MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 40A, § 6 (2000)). 
140 Heritage Park, 674 N.E.2d at 236. 
141 !d. at 234. 
142 !d. 
143Id. 
144Id. 
145 !d. Because the definitive plan had been conditionally approved, Southbridge had 
increased the area and frontage requirements in single- and two-family zoning districts, 
which included areas encompassed by the subdivision plan. Id. 
146 Heritage Park, 674 N.E.2d at 234. 
147 Id. at 235 n.4. 
148 Id. at 235. 
622 Environmentalliffairs [Vol. 30:605 
tion. "149 The town had conditioned the initial approval in order to 
ensure that the groundwork necessary to serve each lot150 was com-
pleted before the lot being built upon or conveyed.151 In a sweeping 
statement, the court intoned, "Once a definitive subdivision plan is 
'finally approved' ... the eight-year zoning freeze is secure. "152 The 
court noted that nothing in the Zoning Act suggested that the con-
tinued existence of the zoning freeze was linked to subdivision ap-
proval,l53 In a final insult to the planning board, the court extended 
the zoning freeze "for a period equal to the duration of [the] ac-
tion. "154 
Courts have, however, vigilantly enforced the requirement that a 
definitive plan must be approved within seven months after the sub-
mission of the preliminary plan.155 In Arenstam v. Planning Board, for 
example, the plaintiff filed a preliminary plan with the planning 
board and then filed a definitive plan exactly seven months later. 156 
The planning board disapproved of the definitive plan because it did 
not comply with the rules and regulations of the board, and because it 
did not comply with the zoning bylaws.157 The plaintiff then resubmit-
ted the plan with amendments, and the plan was again disapproved by 
the board.158 The plaintiff argued that he was entitled to the grandfa-
ther protection of chapter 40A, section 6, even though the amended 
definitive plan was resubmitted after more than seven months. 159 The 
court rejected this argument and explained that this zoning-freeze 
protection only applied to amended definitive plans submitted within 
seven months after a preliminary plan.160 The court noted that an 
amended definitive plan resubmitted after the seven-month period 
would be treated as a new plan; thus, the eight-year protection would 
begin at that point. 161 Therefore, although the legislature was gener-
ous in affording protection to approved definitive plans, the court was 
149Id. 
150 Heritage wanted to subdivide the property into 143 single- and two-family dwelling 
lots. Id. at 234. 
151Id. 
152 Heritage Park, 674 N.E.2d at 235. 
153Id. 
154 Id. at 237. 
155 See. e.g., Arenstam v. Planning Bd., 560 N.E.2d 142, 144 (l\Iass. App. Ct. 1990). 
156 Id. at 143. 
157 !d. 
158Id. at 143-44. 
159 Id. at 144. 
160 Id. at 144-45. 
161 il.rcllstam, 560 N.E.2d at 145. 
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not willing to extend that protection any further than required by the 
statute.162 
Comparing the two paragraphs of section 6 reveals that, unlike 
vacant lots, pre-existing nonconforming structures receive relatively 
little protection from zoning changes.163 This statutory scheme en-
courages sprawl by severely constraining the use of existing structures, 
and thereby encouraging new construction. This scheme also makes it 
difficult for localities to control future sprawl because vacant lots re-
main subject to the old zoning laws for eight years.164 
It does not appear that any facial or as-applied challenges have 
been brought against the eight-year protection. A locality might argue 
that it violates substantive due process under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment; the likelihood of success is discussed below.165 
D. Zoning Changes and ''Approval Not Required" Plans 
The sixth paragraph in chapter 40A, section 6, addressing zoning 
changes and "approval not required" (ANR) plans, also unduly con-
strains a locality's ability to manage growth.166 The statute provides: 
When [an ANR plan] has been submitted to a planning 
board and written notice of such submission has been given 
to the city or town clerk, the use of the land shown on such 
plan shall be governed by applicable provisions of the zon-
ing ordinance or by-law in effect at the time of the submis-
sion of such plan ... and for a period of three years from the 
date of endorsement by the planning board ... .167 
Consistent with the plain meaning of this language, courts have found 
that endorsed plans that do not require approval under the subdivi-
sion control law enjoy a zoning-freeze period of three years.168 The 
zoning-freeze period is meant to protect a developer during the plan-
ning stage of a building project.169 In addition, the protection af-
forded by this paragraph extends to both uses as of right and uses sub-
ject to a special permit under the zoning laws in effect at the time of 
162 See id. 
163 The Zoning Act, MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 40A, § 6 (2000). 
164 [d. 
165 See discussion infra Part V.B. 
166 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 40A, § 6. 
167 [d. 
168 E.g., Samson v. San-Land Dev. Corp., 458 N.E.2d 1201, 1203 (Mass. App. Ct. 1984). 
169 Falcone v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 389 N.E.2d 1032, 1033 (Mass. App. Ct. 1979). 
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the approval.1 70 Although not as egregious as the eight-year zoning 
freeze protection for vacant land governed by a definitive plan, the 
three-year period might still make it difficult for a locality to manage 
growth and control sprawl.l7l The provision still forces a locality to 
plan and correctly anticipate sprawl three years from the date it passes 
a law, with no recourse if conditions change rapidly during that three-
year period and present new growth challenges not covered by exist-
ing law. I72 
The Massachusetts Appeals Court, in Falcone v. Zoning Board of 
Appeals, confronted a dispute about the three-year protection pe-
riod. 173 In that case, the plaintiff applied for a building permit the day 
before the three-year zoning-freeze period was set to expire. I74 The 
Brockton Zoning Board of Appeals denied the application after the 
expiration of the three-year period on the basis that the section 6 pro-
tection had expired by the time that the permit was denied. 175 The 
plaintiff contended that he was only required to apply for a building 
permit within the three-year period to ensure that his application 
would be governed by the zoning laws in effect at the time his plans 
were submitted. I76 The court disagreed, stating that the mere filing of 
a permit application did not toll the running of the zoning-freeze pe-
riod. I77 
In Long v. Board of Appeals, the plaintiff abutters challenged a zon-
ing freeze as applied to one of the defendants' property because of 
the submission of an ANR plan. I78 The defendant, Albert Price, ap-
plied to the Falmouth Board of Appeals for a special permit to use 
part of his property for a dental office. I79 At the time of this special 
permit application, Falmouth bylaws would have allowed the defen-
dant's residentially zoned property to be used as a dental office, sub-
ject to certain restrictions imposed by special permit. I80 While the 
Price's special permit application was pending, Falmouth published 
notice that it was considering an amendment to the bylaws that would 
170 Millerv. Bd. of Appeals. 396 N.E.2d 180, 180-81 (Mass. App. Ct. 1979). 
171 See Russell, supra note 13. at 3. 
172 See id. at 3-4. 6. 
173 389 N.E.2d at 1033. 
174 Id. at 1032. 
175 Id. at 1033. 
176Id. 
177 Id. at 1034. 
178 588 N.E.2d 692. 693 (Mass. App. Ct. 1992). 
179Id. 
180 Id. 
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make Price's property ineligible for a special permit. 181 On October 
20, 1988, Price submitted a plan seeking an ANR endorsement solely 
for the purpose of obtaining a zoning freeze for the property,182 On 
November 2, 1988, the town voted to adopt the special permit zoning 
changes, and on November 8, 1988, the board gave Price's plan an 
ANR endorsement. 183 The Board of Appeals ultimately granted the 
special permit on November 16, 1988.184 This is important, for as the 
Massachusetts Appeals Court noted, the reference to "use" in the lan-
guage of chapter 40A, section 6, paragraph 6 includes use by special 
permit as well as use by right,185 
The abutters claimed that the endorsement of the ANR plan was 
invalid because Price had no intention of recording the plan.186 The 
court rejected this argument, noting that nothing in chapter 40A, sec-
tion 6, paragraph 6 required the recording of a plan as a prerequisite 
for a zoning freeze. 187 The abutters also argued that the zoning-freeze 
provision did not apply to developed land. l88 The court again re-
buffed them, proclaiming that the protection afforded by the zoning-
freeze provision is "broad, certain, and unambiguous. "189 The court 
deemed that the presence of a structure on the property at the time 
of the ANR application was irrelevant. 19o Although ruling against the 
abutters, the court seemed to sympathize with their situation, realiz-
ing that the statute provided an easy way for a developer to gain a zon-
ing freeze for three years, whether or not he or she ever actually in-
tended to develop the property.191 The court commiserated: 
We recognize, however, that, in general, the right to obtain a 
three-year zoning freeze by submitting a plan for ANR en-
dorsement is very broad. As we interpret the statute, it has 
the potential for permitting a developer, or at least a sophis-
ticated one, to frustrate municipal legislative intent by sub-
mitting a plan not for any purpose related to subdivision 
control and not as a preliminary to a conveyance or record-
181Id. 
182Id. 
183 Id. 
184 Long. 588 N.E.2d at 693. 
185 Id. 
186 Id. at 694. 
187Id. 
188 Id. 
189Id. 
190 Long. 588 N.E.2rl at 695. 
191 See id. at 695 n.7. 
626 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 30:605 
ing, but solely for the purpose of obtaining a freeze. Any 
overbreadth in the protection afforded by the statute, how-
ever, will have to be cured by the Legislature.192 
A locality is often powerless to impose new zoning regulations on 
vacant land to control sprawl. At the same time, the Zoning Act has 
made it difficult to alter pre-existing nonconforming structures. 193 As 
will be explained infra, other states have taken a different, more pro-
gressive approach.194 
E. Approaches Taken by Localities Within the Existing StatutoTY Scheme 
Given the difficulties of changing the eXlstmg statutory 
scheme,195 localities have attempted to accomplish their smart growth 
priorities in spite of the statutory constraints on controlling sprawl. 
One strategy used to control the rate of development was to limit the 
number of building permits issued for residential construction.196 The 
town of Chilmark enacted such a bylaw, allowing only ten percent of 
the number of building permits to be issued per year for subdivisions 
with a total land area sufficient to provide more than ten dwellings at 
the maximum permitted density.197 In StuTges v. Town of ChilmaTk, the 
plaintiffs brought a facial challenge, alleging that the bylaw violated 
substantive due process, and that the town had acted ultra viTes. 198 As 
will be discussed,199 the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court upheld 
the constitutionality of the law, and also found that the town had the 
requisite statutory authority to adopt it.200 
In attempting to control development, the court has been clear 
that the extensive powers granted to localities under chapter 40A are 
not to be narrowly interpreted.201 In Collura v. Town of Arlington, the 
town enacted a two-year moratorium on apartment building construc-
192 [d. The legislature neglected to take up the court's suggestion to amend the statute. 
193 The Zoning Act, MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 40A, § 6 (2000). 
194 Russell, supra note 13, at 3 (noting that states as varied as South Carolina, Washing-
ton, Maine, and Utah have enacted land use legislation that allows localities to plan for 
and manage growth); seediscussion infra Part IV. 
195 Russell, supra note 13, at 1 (noting that the "power of special interest lobbies and 
the very incomprehensibility of the subject matter to most state legislators have posed 
monumental barriers to reform in the past"). 
196 Sturges v. Town of Chilmark, 402 N.E.2d 1346. 1349 (Mass. 1980). 
197 [d. at 1349 n.6. 
198 [d. at 1349. 
199 See discussion infra Part V.A.l. 
200 Stlllges, 402 N.E.2d at 1350. 
201 Collura v. Town of Arlington, 329 N.E.2d 733, 736 (Mass. 1975). 
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tion in certain areas of Arlington.202 The Massachusetts Supreme Ju-
dicial Court upheld the bylaw. because it allowed for full public de-
bate while protecting the area from "unwise exploitation. "203 As an-
other example of a locality's extensive zoning powers, even under the 
current statute, the court upheld a three-acre minimum lot require-
ment. 204 
Consistent with such local strategies to manage growth, at least 
one commentator has suggested that the Massachusetts Environ-
mental Policy Act (MEPA) can be used as a tool to manage growth. 
even without a change in the current statutory scheme.205 MEPA 
forces state actors to weigh the environmental impacts of their proj-
ects or projects they sanction through permits.206 This commentator's 
viewpoint will be discussed further i1lJra.207 
IV. LAND USE STATUTES IN OREGON: PROGRESSIVE 
PLANNING FOR GROWTH208 
Other states that have taken a different, more progressive ap-
proach, have obviated the need for localities to apply band-aid ap-
proaches to underlying statutory problems. In order to understand 
the evolution of so-called growth management statutes, it is helpful to 
explain the historical foundation of zoning. The dominant model of 
land use regulation in the United States is Euclidean, or local zon-
ing.209 Almost every state and major city with the exception of Hous-
ton, Texas continues to base its land use controls on Euclidean zon-
ing.2lO Under this model, zoning ordinances divide a municipality into 
zones in order to regulate the type and density of land use.211 The 
present utility of this zoning model, developed during the early twen-
tieth century, has been questioned, however, because of the change 
202 Id. at 734. 
203 Id. at 737; see discussion infra Part V.A.I. 
204 Johnson v. Town of Edgartown, 680 N .E.2d 37, 42 (Mass. 1997). 
205 Jay Wickersham, Managing Growth Without a Growth Management Statute: The Uses of 
NIEPA, NE\v ENG. PLAN. (Am. Planning Ass'n, Mass. & R.1. chapters), Apr. 2001, at I, 
http://www.massapa.org/newsletters/ April2001.pdf (last visited May 12, 2003). 
206 Massachusetts Environmental Policy Act, MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 30, § 62 (2000). 
207 Sec discussion inji'll Part V.A.2. 
208 Oregon was selected as representative of the many states that have enacted growth 
management statutes. Although there are differences among these statutes, the emphasis 
here is on the contrast between states with and states without growth management stat-
utes-not on the exact provisions of any particular statute. 
209 Wickersham, sllpm note 48, at 492. 
210 Id. at 493. 
211 Id. 
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from a largely urban demographic to one that is predominantly sub-
urban.212 The pre-World War II pattern of development, which con-
sisted of a downtown commercial core surrounded by urban and sub-
urban residential housing, no longer exists.213 Suburban zoning 
encourages low population densities, which contributes to the prob-
lem of spraw1.214 Euclidean zoning was developed on the premise of 
regulating small-scale development, rather than regulating large-scale 
projects such as residential subdivisions, industrial parks, or shopping 
malls. 215 
Nine states enacted statutes that reasserted state control over 
land development policies beginning in the early 1970s and continu-
ing through the 1980s.216 The list included states as diverse as Florida, 
Georgia, Maine, Maryland, New Jersey, Oregon, Rhode Island. Ver-
mont, and Washington.217 Notably, Massachusetts was not among this 
group.218 These growth management statutes are intended to achieve 
higher density developmen ts, a greater mixture of uses, and a more 
abrupt transformation from urban areas to the surrounding green-
belts.219 
In 1973, Oregon passed a growth management statute that 
shifted regulatory power from the local level to the regional or state 
leve1.22o The Legislative Assembly declared that the uncoordinated use 
of lands within the state threatened "the orderly development, the 
environment of [the] state and the health, safety, order, convenience, 
prosperity and welfare of the people of [Oregon]. "221 To counter this 
threat, the legislature created a statewide planning agency to fornlU-
late planning goals that are to be applied by localities.222 The Oregon 
planning structure relies on the use of comprehensive plans drawn up 
by cities and towns to implement these goals. 223 The legislature identi-
fied the implementation and enforcement of these plans to he of 
212 See id. at 494. Although the historical trend of suburbanization began in the nine-
teenth century, it accelerated rapidly in the second half of the twentieth century. Id. 
213Id. 
214 Id. at 495. 
215 Wickersham, supra note 48, at 496. 
216Id. at 489. 
217 Id. at 489 n.2. 
218Id. 
219 Id. at 507. 
220 Id. at 512. 
221 1973 OR. LAWS 80 (codified as amended at OR. REV. STAT. §§ 197.005-.860 
(2001)). 
222 OR. REV. STAT. § 197.005. 
223 Id. § 197.010. 
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statewide concern.224 The scheme relies on state oversight of local 
zoning, rather than direct state or regional regulation of major proj-
ects or areas of critical environmental concern.225 
The statute created a seven-member Land Conservation and De-
yelopment Commission (LCDC) and authorized it to adopt statewide 
planning goals.226 The LCDC, which administers and enforces land 
use planning, may adopt, by rule, any statewide land use policy 
needed to implement the growth management statute. 227 The LCDC 
principally adopts land use planning goals, collects information on 
land use, prepares statewide planning guidelines, reviews comprehen-
sive plans for consistency with articulated goals, and ensures public 
participation in the process.228 
The statute also created the Department of Land Conservation 
and Development (Department), which includes a director, subordi-
nate employees, and the LCDC.229 The Department Director may seek 
review of land use decisions involving the goals, acknowledged com-
prehensive plan, or land nse regulations promulgated under the stat-
ute. 230 
The statutory authority of the LCDC to establish statewide land 
use planning goals was challenged by the intervenors in Meyer v. 
Lord,231 who alleged that such broad delegation of legislative power 
violated the Oregon Constitution.232 The court found this allegation 
without merit. 233 Upholding the power of a state agency to establish 
224Id. § 197.013. 
225 Wickersham. supra note 48. at 522-23. This is contrasted with the model used in 
Vermont, for example. Vermont also passed a growth management statute in the early 
1970s in which regional or state level approval was required for major development proj-
ects. Id. at 512. Under Vermont's program the proponent of a major development project 
must obtain a project permit from one of the nine regional Environmental District Com-
missions (EDCs). !d. at 513. The threshold for coming under the regulatory reach of this 
statute is quite low; the statute covers all public and private construction "involving" ten or 
more acres, and residential construction projects with ten or more units. Id. at 513-14. An 
EDC may decline to grant a permit if it finds that the project will be "detrimental to the 
public health, safety or general welfare." Id. at 514. Statewide planning was meant to ac-
company the statute but the statewide plan was never adopted. Id. at 522. 
523. 
226 OR. REV. STAT. §§ 197.030(1), 197.040(1) (c)(A); Wickersham, supra note 48, at 
227 OR. REV. STAT. § 197.040(1) (c) (A). 
228Id. § 197.040(2). 
229 Id. § 197.075. 
230 !d. § 197.090(2) (a). 
231 586 P.2d 367, 370 (Or. Ct. App. 1978). 
232Id. 
233 Id. at 371. 
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statewide land use planning goals, the court noted that there are 
standards for the agency to apply and also safeguards for those whose 
interest may be affected, including provisions for judicial review.234 
The power of the LCDC appears to be quite broad.235 In A lex-
anderson v. Board of Commissioners, the court considered whether state-
wide planning goals promulgated by the LCDC applied to the parti-
tion of a twenty-fIve-acre tract of land in Polk County, Oregon, even 
though the county did not have an "acknowledged" comprehensive 
plan.236 The narrow issue was whether the county should decide if the 
partition could go forward based on a county ordinance, or based 
upon the statewide planning goals. 237 The court held that the statute 
directed that LCDC's statewide planning goals, not local ordinances, 
were controlling in that case.238 
This brief look at Oregon's growth management statute illus-
trates how differently Massachusetts and Oregon have approached the 
problem of sprawl. Whereas Oregon deals with such statewide or re-
gional growth problems on a statewide or regional basis, Massachu-
setts, lacking a growth management program, deals with the same 
problems almost exclusively at the local level,239 Yet, the power of the 
local authorities in Massachusetts to manage growth is severely con-
strained by the eight-year statutory zoning freeze for vacant land.240 
V. ANALYSIS 
A. Can Urban Sprawl Be Managed Under the Cll rrent 
Massachusetts Zoning Act? 
Given the existing Massachusetts statutory scheme,241 is it possible 
for localities to enact smart growth policies that are not defeated by 
the long-term protection given to vacant land under chapter 40A, sec-
tion 6? Although some regulatory tools are available to soften the im-
pacts of development, there does not appear to be any way to defeat 
234Id. 
235 See. e.g., Alexanderson v. Bd. ofComm'rs, 616 P.2d 459,242 (Or. 1980). 
236 Id. at 460. A comprehensive plan is "acknowledged" or approved when the LCDC 
certifies that it is consistent with statewide planning goals. OR. REV. STAT. § 197.015 
(2001). 
237 l1.lexandel'son, 616 P.2d at 461-62. 
238 Id. at 463. 
239 See Wickersham, supra note 48, at n.2. 
240 The Zoning Act, MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 40A, § 6 (2000). 
241 See discllssion supra Part III. 
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the eight-year protection given to endorsed definitive plans, and to 
plan for growth before it occurs. Therefore, the best possible approach 
is a two-track strategy of using these regulatory tools to their fullest 
extent, while at the same time seeking statutory solutions through 
passage of a growth management statute242 and reforming chapter 
40A, section 6. 
1. The Use of Temporary Developmen t Bans 
One way localities may attempt to implement smart growth poli-
cies and mitigate the eight-year protection problem is by imposing 
either temporary bans or temporary limitations on development. This 
may be accomplished through a short-term moratorium on subdivi-
sion plan approvals, or by agreeing to approve only a specified num-
ber of subdivision plans per year until the locality can enact a com-
prehensive plan utilizing smart growth policies.243 The boundaries of 
a locality's power to ban development temporarily are not entirely 
clear under the current Zoning Act and the United States Constitu-
tion; it would appear to be an area that proceeds on a case-by-case ba-
sis, and is not yet amenable to general rules. 244 
In Sturges v. Town of Chilmark, the town enacted a zoning bylaw 
that slowed the rate of development by limiting the number of build-
ing permits issued for residential construction.245 The restrictions 
were quite severe-for subdivisions with a total land area sufficient to 
provide more than ten dwellings at the maximum permitted density, 
only ten percent of the building permits would be issued each year for 
ten years. 246 If these lots were sold before they were developed, then 
242 A report on sprawl by the Massachusetts Audubon Society advocates passing a 
growth management plan that is enforceable for every municipality in the Common-
wealth. STEEL. supra note 18, at 16. 
243 See Sturges y. Town of Chilmark, 402 N.E.2d 1346, 1349 (Mass. 1980). 
244 The issue of whether a temporary moratorium on land de\'e1opment, imposed in 
order to create a comprehensive land use plan, constitutes a per se taking of property re-
quiring compensation under the Takings Clause was recently decided by the United States 
Supreme Court. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. y. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 
302, 306 (2002). Rejecting a categorical rule of a per se taking in that situation, Justice 
Stevens explained, "In our view the answer to the abstract question whether a temporary 
moratorium effects a taking is neither 'yes, always' nor 'no, neyer'; the answer depends 
upon the particular circumstances of the case." Id. at 321. The proper application of Tahoe 
to a locality's attempt to enact a temporary deyelopment ban in Massachusetts is unclear, 
although it would appear that it is possible to structure such a temporary deyelopment ban 
so that it passes constitutional muster. 
245 -102 N.E.2d at 1349. 
246 Id. at 1349 n.6. 
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this restriction would be incorporated into the deed for that prop-
erty.247 
In bringing a facial challenge, the plaintiffs alleged that the law 
violated substantive due process and that the town had exceeded its 
statutory authority.248 The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court up-
held the constitutionality of the law and also found that the town had 
the requisite statutory authority to adopt it.249 In so holding, the court 
stated that a municipality could impose "reasonable time limitations 
on development, at least where those restrictions are temporary and 
adopted to provide controlled development while the municipality 
engages in comprehensive planning studies. "250 The court noted that 
the purpose of the Zoning Act-to allow towns and municipalities to 
resolve a variety of land use issues including the adequate provision of 
infrastructure, an important concern with unmanaged growth-sup-
ported the limitation enacted.251 The conrt continued, "From the 
wide scope of the purposes of The Zoning Act, it is apparen t that the 
Legislature intended to permit cities and towns to adopt any and all 
zoning provisions which are constitutionally permissible, subject, 
however, to limitations expressly stated in that act or in other control-
ling legislation. "252 
In another case, the court held that the extensive powers granted 
to cities and towns under the Zoning Act were not to be narrowly in-
terpreted.253 The court found that the interim zoning at issue, a two-
year moratorium on the construction of apartment buildings in cer-
tain areas of Arlington, allowed for full public debate while protecting 
the area from "unwise exploitation" before reaching an agreement on 
potentially more restrictive zoning bylaws.254 The broad language em-
ployed by the courts in Sturges and in Collura v. Town of Arlington is in-
structive for towns that are considering temporary development 
moratoriums while they enact laws to manage future development. 255 
247Id. 
248Id. at 1349. 
249 Id. at 1350. 
250Id. 
251 Sturges, 402 N.E.2d at 1350-5l. 
252 !d. at 135l. Admittedly, this statement by the court begs the question whether a 
temporary ban on endorsing subdivision plans would be constitutionally or statutorily 
permissible. Id. 
253 Collura v. Town of Arlington, 329 N.E.2d 733, 736 (Mass. 1975). 
254 Id. at 734, 737. 
255 See Sturges, 402 N.E.2d at 1350-51; Collura, 329 N.E.2d at 737. 
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Importantly, both the Sturges and Collum courts also used limiting 
language.256 Although it upheld the bylaw as constitutional, the Stwges 
court also suggested that the particular circumstances of the munici-
pality would have some bearing on the constitutional result. 257 Signifi-
cantly, in Stulges, the Town of Chilmark made a prima facie showing of 
rationality by providing specific, tangible concerns to which time limi-
tations on development were a reasonable response.258 The court al-
lowed Chilmark the opportunity to test the usefulness of the bylaw, 
although it was unclear for how long the court would allow such de-
velopment restrictions to continue.259 
Presenting a potentially difficult hurdle for localities to over-
come, the court appeared to tailor the holding to the specific facts of 
the case.260 It noted that Chilmark was a Martha's Vineyard town with 
a year-round population of 400 people, an annual budget of $350,000, 
a land area of 10.500 acres, and five paved public ways.261 In addition, 
the restriction generally applied to the construction of second or va-
cation homes, rather than primary dwellings.262 Finally, Chilmark al-
ready had studies underway on how to confront the sprawl problem 
for which it needed the time to develop controls.263 Under these cir-
cumstances the court thought it reasonable that the town wanted time 
to decide whether sprawl was becoming a problem, and to remedy 
problems that it may find. 264 This suggests that it would be more diffi-
cult to sustain a stopgap measure such as the one proposed in a local-
ity in which growth was rampant and there was a high demand for ad-
ditional primary housing.265 Ironically, this is exactly the type of 
situation in which a locality might need to seek a temporary morato-
rium on growth in order to have time to devise a solution. 
256 Sturges, 402 N.E.2d at 1353; Collura, 329 N.E.2d at 737-38. 
257 402 N.E.2d at 1353. 
258 fd. at 1354. 
259/d. at 1354,1355 n.16. 
260 See id. at 1354. 
261/d. 
262 fd. 
263 Sturges, 402 N.E.2d at 1355 n.16. 
264 fd. Similar considerations were important to the court's decision to uphold a two-
year moratorium on apartment buildings in Collura v. Town of Arlington, 329 N.E.2d 733, 
738 (Mass. 1975). 
265 See Sturges, 402 N.E.2d at 1352. The court in Johnson v. Town of Edgartown, 680 
N.E.2d 37, 39 (Mass. 1997), was similarly concerned about the effect of a zoning bylaw 
meant to control de\'elopment on available primary housing stock. The court in that case 
upheld a three-acre minimum area requirement for residential lots, partly because it did 
not impact the availability of primary housing stock. See id. at 40, 42. 
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In Stlt'1ges, it is significant that the town was on Martha's Vineyard, 
and that the legislature had expressed a public interest in the preser-
vation of the qualities of Martha's Vineyard.266 A court might need to 
be convinced that there is similar region-wide interest in combating 
sprawl to uphold a temporary development limitation elsewhere.267 
Therefore, localities wishing to take advantage of the Stulges ruling 
would need to emphasize those characteristics that make it similar to 
Chilmark or distinguish dissimilar characteristics.268 
A locality attempting to set aside time to develop smart growth 
laws might want to prohibit the endorsement of definitive or prelimi-
nary plans temporarily, rather than control the rate at which building 
permits were issued, as Chilmark did.269 It is unclear from Stltlges 
whether a locality could do SO,270 but arguably the rationale behind 
both approaches is similar, so both actions could be constitutionally 
permissible. 
The use of temporary development bans is not a long-term solu-
tion to the problem of unmanaged growth because it does not soften 
the impact of the eight-year zoning freeze. A locality will still be 
forced to speculate about which measures it must pass to manage fu-
ture growth adequately. Furthermore, the time frame for a permissi-
ble development ban would probably be relatively short,271 and cou-
pled with the scarce resources available to many localities,272 trying to 
plan for growth during a short-term ban might present a Herculean 
task. 
2. The Massachusetts Environmental Policy Act as a Regulatory Tool 
to Combat Sprawl 
Some of sprawl's impacts, but not sprawl itself, might be manage-
able under the current statutory scheme by using already-existing laws 
266 Sturges. 402 N.E.2d at 1354; accord johnson, 680 N.E.2d at 39. The johnson court 
stressed the expressed statewide interest in preserving Martha's Vineyard, stating, "Those 
interests justify the making of conservative assumptions about the consequences of land 
uses, even if standing alone protection of those interests might not support the imposition 
of three-acre zoning." johnson, 680 N.E.2d at 42. 
267 See id. 
268 See 402 N.E.2d at 1353. 
269Id. at 1349. 
270 See id. at 1350. 
271 See id. at 1354. 
272 Sec Russell, supra note 13. at 6. 
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such as the Massachusetts Environmental Policy Act (MEPA).273 At its 
heart, MEPA forces state actors274 to weigh the environmental impacts 
of their projects, or projects they sanction through the issuance of 
permits.275 Because of this, MEPA applies to both private and public 
development projects.276 Provided that a project will have environ-
mental impacts,277 there is a statutory mandate to articulate and con-
sider any alternatives to such projects, or to impose mitigation meas-
lues to lessen the environmental impacts of the project.278 
Unlike NEPA, its federal counterpart, MEPA is substantive in that 
it requires government to "use all practicable means and measures to 
minimize and prevent damage to the environment."279 MEPA also 
mandates that statutes be "interpreted and administered so as to 
minimize damage to the environment."28o Thus, once a project falls 
under MEPA jurisdiction, substantive environmental benefits can be 
achieved.281 MEPA can be substantively enforceable when mitigation 
measures agreed to during MEPA review are adopted through legally 
binding findings. 282 Once there is MEPA jurisdiction over a project 
and the project is found to have negative environmental impacts, the 
State may require the proponent to undertake all feasible actions to 
avoid damage to the environment.283 If damage cannot be avoided, 
then the State may require the applicant to implement all feasible 
measures to minimize the environmental impacts of the project, or to 
fulfIll mitigation measures designed to lessen the environmental ef-
fects "to the maximum extent practicable. "284 
It must be stressed that MEPA does not apply to private projects 
not requiring any state action.285 nor to projects that do not exceed a 
certain review threshold. 286 As a consequence, many projects escape 
273 Massachusetts Euvironmental Policy Act. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 30, §§ 61-62H 
(2000). 
274 As described by the statute, these actors are "agencies, departments, boards, com-
missions and authorities of the commonwealth." [d. 
275 [d. § 62. 
276 [d. 
2i7 The statute does not reach environmental impacts that cause "insignificant damage 
to or impairment of [listed] resources." [d. § 61. 
278 [d. 
279 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 30, § 61 (2000); Payne. supra note 20, at 539. 
280 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 30, § 61; Payne, supra note 20, at 539. 
281 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 30, § 61. 
282 'Vickersham, slIpra note 205, at 8. 
283 MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 301, § 11.12(5) (a) (2001). 
284 !d. 
2B5l\1ASS. GEN. LAWS eh. 30, § 61. 
286 MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 301, § 11.03. 
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MEPA review.287 Furthermore, any potential environmental review of a 
private project under MEPA usually occurs when the entity undertak-
ing the project is required to obtain a state permit.288 When a devel-
oper files a preliminary or definitive plan to gain the Zoning Act's 
eight-year protection, there is no state action; thus, MEPA is not yet 
applicable to the project, if it ever will be.289 The environmental ef-
fects of endorsing the location of a subdivision in the first place can-
not be reviewed under MEPA. In this sense, MEPA does not directly 
address unplanned growth. Under the current Zoning Act, MEPA will 
be inapplicable to the various subdivisions already grandfathered un-
der the old zoning laws for a period of eight years.290 
It has been suggested that MEPA can be used to manage growth, 
even without a change in the current statutory scheme.291 Although 
this is true to a limited extent, it appears more accurate to say that 
sprawl's impacts can be softened by MEPA review, but the statute's 
utility is seriously limited because only private projects involving state 
action may be subject to MEPA jurisdiction.292 MEPA can only soften 
the impacts of the already-existing development rights, without re-
viewing whether those development rights should have been granted 
in the first place. 
Under this limited tool, the MEPA Office within the Executive 
Office of Environmental Affairs reviews approximately 300 projects a 
year at the initial stage of an Environmental Notification Form 
(ENF).293 Presumably, these 300 projects are large in scale, and al-
though this number might represent a small percentage of all such 
projects undertaken on a yearly basis, reviewing these projects might 
have a significant effect on reducing sprawJ.294 At the same time, it 
should be reemphasized that sprawl is problematic because it often 
places development in locations lacking the infrastructure to accom-
modate new growth. MEPA's utility in this respect is to ensure that this 
additional infrastructure is provided in an environmentally sensitive 
manner. 
287Id. 
288 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 30, § 61. 
289 Id. § 62. 
290 The Zoning Act, MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 40A, § 6 (2000). 
291 Wickersham, supra note 205, at 8 (noting that the "1998 reyisions to the MEPA 
Regulations ... modified the reyiew thresholds" to allow for increased consideration of 
projects that might contribute to sprawl). 
292 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 30, § 62. 
293 Wickersham, supra note 205, at 7. 
294 See id. 
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Given the severe constraints placed upon localities to manage 
sprawl in their communities under the current statutory scheme, and 
the limited regulatory tools that might be able to mitigate the weak-
nesses of that statutory structure, another avenue for relief would be 
to challenge the legality of the current Zoning Act. 
B. Potential Legal Challenges to the Zoning Act 
There are numerous legal challenges, with varying possibilities 
for success, that could be brought to strike down the eight-year zon-
ing-freeze protection afforded to endorsed subdivision plans under 
chapter 40A, section 6.295 These possible challenges are summarily 
listed here as a way to stimulate a more serious debate about the rela-
tive merits of each. The resulting publicity from these legal challenges 
may bring political pressure on the legislature to amend the eight-
year zoning-freeze provision of the Zoning Act or even to enact com-
prehensive reform. 
1. A Facial Challenge to Chapter 40A, Section 6 
A facial challenge could be brought against the Zoning Act, 
chapter 40A, section 6, alleging a substantive due process violation of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. 296 A locality could challenge the eight-
year zoning-freeze protection, arguing that it violates substantive due 
process under the Fourteenth Amendment because it is arbitrary. 
This challenge, however, would be difficult because state statutes en-
joy a strong presumption of legislative validity. 297 
The constitutional test in substantive due process challenges such 
as this one is whether the statute is rationally related to the protection 
of health, safety, or welfare. 298 A locality could argue that even if the 
eight-year protection was rational at the time it was passed in 1982,299 
circumstances have changed so substantially in the ensuing twenty 
years that the provision is now arbitrary and irrational. 
295 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 40A, § 6. 
296 The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides in part, 
"nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
297 Sec, e.g., ViII. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926) ("If the valid-
ity of the legislative classification for zoning purposes be fairly debatable, the legislative 
judgment must be allowed to contro\."). 
298Id. at 391. 
299 Act of June 28, 1982, ch. 185, 1982 Mass. Acts (changing the protection to eight 
years) . 
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2. An As-Applied Challenge to Chapter 40A, Section 6 
There might be a greater chance of success under an as-applied 
challenge compared with a facial challenge.30o A locality could claim 
that chapter 40A, section 6 violates substantive due process under the 
Fourteenth Amendment as applied to its particular circumstances. 
For example, a locality whose population is exploding faster than its 
ability to provide public services could argue that it is irrational to 
prohibit it from being able to regulate vacant land for eight years. 
With such fast-paced development, the eight-year protection is irra-
tional because the locality could never adequately plan for the 
growth, and its infrastructure would be overwhelmed. This argument 
might be strongest for those localities that are under substantial de-
velopment pressure and have large ecologically sensitive areas, condi-
tions similar to those found on Cape Cod. 
3. The Eight-Year Protection Provision Violates the Horne Rule 
Amendment 
A locality could bring a claim that the eight-year protection pro-
vision violates the Horne Rule Amendment under the Massachusetts 
Constitution.30! Although the legislature has the power in general to 
pass a statute affording vacant land protection from zoning changes, 
the eight-year period that it has provided is such an imposition on lo-
cal control, which is so highly valued under the Horne Rule Amend-
ment, that it cannot stand. This argument is substantially diminished 
by the fact that a locality's authority is explicitly limited by Massachu-
setts's preemptory use of that same power.302 Thus, this would seem to 
be an area in which Massachusetts has merely decided to assert its 
authority to legislate under the police power.303 
4. The Eight-Year Zoning Freeze Violates the Public Trust Doctrine 
One of the underpinnings of the Public Trust doctrine is that a 
state may not substantially impair a public resource over which it ex-
ercises control.3°4 There are various untested theories through which 
the Public Trust doctrine might be used to defeat the legality of the 
300 Ellclid, 272 U.S. at 395-96. 
301 MASS. CONST. amend. art. II, § 89; Home Rule Procedures Act, MASS. GEN. LAWS 
ch. 43B, §§ 1-20 (2000). 
302 Rohwedder, supra note 97, at 1128. 
303 See id. 
304 Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 435 (1892). 
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eight-year zoning freeze. It could be argued that by enacting the 
eight-year zoning freeze, Massachusetts has so broadly abdicated its 
ability to regulate under the police power that its action is inherently 
inconsistent with its trustee duty to safeguard public trust resources. 
For example, if streams and rivers in Massachusetts are considered 
Public Trust resources, then a state. statute that substantially impairs 
those resources might violate the Public Trust doctrine. In an as-
applied challenge, a plaintiff would need to show that the eight-year 
zoning freeze so severely restricted a locality's ability to manage 
growth along a public waterbody or watercourse-causing impair-
ment of the waterbody or watercourse through increased siltation, 
pollution runoff, etc.-that the State's action was inconsistent with its 
duty to protect those resources for the public. As the Supreme Court 
said in Illinois Centml Railroad Co. v. Illinois, "The state can no more 
abdicate its trust over property in which the whole people are inter-
ested ... than it can abdicate its police powers in the administration 
of government and the preservation of the peace. "305 
CONCLUSION 
As Turner and Rylander stated, "Growth is inevitable, but ugli-
ness and environmental degradation are not."306 Given this realiza-
tion, the eight-year zoning freeze in the Zoning Act must be amended 
so that localities may manage growth in order to minimize ugliness 
and environmental degradation. Unfortunately, the prospects for re-
form of the biases of the Zoning Act against a locality's ability to plan 
for and manage growth seem unlikely. Given the limited regulatory 
tools available to localities under the current Zoning Act to enact 
smart growth policies, it seems inevitable that more legal disputes will 
erupt as localities attempt to control unmanaged development. 
Whether political momentum or the courts will solve Massachusetts's 
sprawl problem is difficult to predict. What is certain is that unless the 
zoning-freeze period is at least reduced, Massachusetts will continue 
to lag behind other states while its localities struggle to navigate the 
current misguided legal framework to manage uncontrolled growth. 
305 Id. at 453. 
306 Turner & Rylander. supra note 1. at 65. 

